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Responding to Public School Peer Sexual
Harassment in the Face of Davis v. Monroe
County Board of Education
INTRODUCTION

Peer sexual harassment has existed in our elementary, sec1
ondary, and post-secondary schools for decades. Recently, it
has surfaced as a ubiquitous legal dilemma. In the past, schools
have largely ignored peer sexual harassment claims. "Most often, schools responded to complaints by suggesting that the victim 'did something' to provoke the harassment or [by] shrug2
ging off the complaint as evidence that 'boys will be boys."'
There has been a pervasive view that peer sexual harassment
is merely the result of social and sexual child development,
that it is "an innocuous emergence of sexual curiosities and attractions among adolescent students. The behavior, however,
3
even if innocent, is dangerous."
In 1993, the American Association of University Women
(AAUW) published a peer sexual harassment study. The study
showed that 81% of students surveyed "had experienced some
form of sexual harassment, ranging from sexual remarks to
4
physical contact. A surprising 85% of girls and 76% of boys reported experiencing 'unwanted and unwelcome sexual behavior

1. See Should Schools Be Held Liable for Peer Sexual Harassment Under Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972? 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 219 (Fall1996).
2. Id. (quoting Doe v. Petaluma School District, 830 F. Supp. 1550, 1565 (N.D.
Cal. 1993)).
3. Laura M. Sullivan, An Evolutionary Perspective of Peer Sexual Harassment in
American Schools: Premising Liability on Sexual, Rather Than Power Dynamics, 3 WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 329 (Spring 1997).
4. See Karen Mellencamp Davis, Note, Reading, Writing, and Sexual Harassment: Finding a Constitutional Remedy When Schools Fail to Address Peer Abuse, 69
IND. L.J. 1123 (Fall 1994) (discussing the American Association of University Women
Educational Foundation, "Hostile Hallways: The AAUW Survey on Sexual Harassment
in American Schools" 7 (June 1993)).
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5

that interferes with their lives."' Such sexual harassment can
take place at any school activity, in the hallways, the classroom, the cafeteria, on field trips, or at any other school spon6
sored area or event. Schools must prevent and respond immediately and reasonably to peer sexual harassment. If left
unchecked, sexual harassment will but worsen. In fact:
The impact of sexual harassment on a student's educational
progress and attainment of future goals can be significant and
should not be underestimated. As a result of sexual harassment, a student may, for example, have trouble learning, drop
a class or drop out of school altogether, lose trust in school officials, become isolated, fear for personal safety, or lose selfesteem.7

Because schools have a responsibility to provide a safe educational environment, and because peer sexual harassment can
have negative long-term psychological effects on student victims, schools "should not accept, tolerate or overlook sexual
8
harassment." School officials, administrators, and teachers
must educate themselves on sexual harassment law. They
must then implement programs and policies responding to the
current law in order to prevent and respond to peer sexual harassment, not only so that they may insulate their school boards
and districts from liability, but so that they may also protect
their students and provide them with the safe school environment students deserve.
Part I of this note discusses the controversy that existed
within the circuit courts prior to and contemporaneously with
the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Monroe County Board
9
of Education. Part II sets forth the facts, the Court's holding,
and reasoning in Davis. Part III continues to analyze the reasoning of the Court and discusses the rationale behind holding
schools responsible and the impact Davis has on public school
districts. Part IV discusses why schools should be held responsible. Part V suggests methods, policies, and procedures that
school administrators can implement in order to shield themselves from liability under Davis and protect students from
5. Id.

6. See Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights, Sexual Harassment: It's
Not Academic (visited Oct. 30, 1999) <http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/ocrshpam.html>.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
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peer sexual harassment.
I. THE CONTROVERSY IN THE CIRCUITS

A. The Eleventh Circuit
In February 1996, the Eleventh Circuit decided Davis v.
Monroe County Board of Education. 10 The court held that peer
sexual harassment is a cognizable claim under Title IX.1 1 The
court analogized the school peer sexual harassment situation to
a co-worker hostile work environment claim under Title VII.
The Court first looked at the language of Title IX 12 and stated
that the issue in the case was "whether the Board's alleged
failure to take action to stop G.F.'s sexual harassment of
LaShonda 'excluded her from participation in, ... denied her
the benefits of, or ... subjected her to discrimination under' the
Monroe county educational system on the basis of her sex." 13
The court stated that Title IX was enacted in order to protect people within the education system from discrimination
based upon their sex.14
To accomplish this goal, employees and students of federally
funded educational institutions who are discriminated
against on the basis of sex have a private right of action under Title IX for injunctive relief and compensatory damages.
Moreover, in interpreting Title IX, 'there is no doubt that if
we are to give it the scope that its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as broad as its language.' 15

In order to accord such a sweep, the court reviewed this

10. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. ofEduc., 74 F.3d 1186 (ll'h Cir. 1996).
11. See id. at 1195.
12. "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
educational program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... " Id. at 1189
(quoting 20 U.S.C. §1681(a) (1988)).
13. Davis, 74 F. 3d at 1189.
14. See id. at 1190. Enacted in 1972, Title IX was designed to protect individuals
from sex discrimination by denying federal financial aid to those educational institutions that bear responsibility for sexually discriminatory practices. See id. Note that
previously the only remedy available for Title IX claims was the denial of federal funding to the institution. However, in 1992, the Supreme Court allowed monetary damages to private plaintiffs for intentional violations of Title IX. Id. (citing Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992)).
15. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1189 (citations omitted).
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peer sexual harassment claim under Title VII principles, rationalizing that other courts have done so, and that these principles are applied to sex discrimination claims made by teachers and other school employees. The court also explained that
the legislative history of Title IX "'strongly suggests that Congress meant for similar substantive standards to apply under
16
Title IX as had been developed under Title VII.'"
Furthermore, the court justified its application of Title VII
to the Title IX context by saying that it had been specifically
authorized by an extension of the Supreme Court's decision in
17
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs. and by the Depart18
ment of Education's Office of Civil Rights. Moreover, the court
felt that "application of these principles to Title IX claims by
students recognizes, as the Supreme Court acknowledged in
Franklin, that a student should have the same protection in
19
school that an employee has in the workplace."
Of course, there are differences between the workplace and
school. The court acknowledged this by stating that these differences only supported the need for greater protection against
20
harassment in schools. The court also emphasized that teachers have greater control and influence upon school children and
21
that children also look to these authorities for protection. Another reason given for granting this protection is that harassment in school can be more damaging to a child than similar
22
behavior occurring to adults in the workplace. The court also
recognized that it is much harder for a child to change schools
than for an adult to change jobs in order to escape the harass23
ment. Furthermore:
[a] nondiscriminatory environment is essential to maximum
intellectual growth and is therefore an integral part of the
educational benefits that a student receives. A sexually abusive environment inhibits, if not prevents, the harassed stu16. Id. (quoting Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 897 (1"' Cir.
1988)).
17. 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992). Subsequently, several courts have understood Franklin to authorize the application of Title VII standards to a student's Title IX sexual
harassment claim against her school. See Davis, 74 F.3d at 1191.
18. See Davis, 74 F.3d at 1191-92.
19. !d.
20. See id. at 1193.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See Davis, 74 F.3d at 1193.
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dent from developing her full intellectual:Rotential and receiving the most from the academic program.

Thus, the court concluded that just as Title VII allows
monetary damages for a hostile work environment, so Title IX
should allow a private action for monetary damages for a hos25
tile school environment due to peer sexual harassment. In order for the school district to be held liable, they must "knowingly [fail] to take action to remedy a hostile environment
caused by a student's sexual harassment of another. [The rationale being that] the harassed student 'has been denied the
benefits of, or been subjected to discrimination under' that edu26
cational program in violation of Title IX."
B. The Fifth Circuit
In April 1996, the Fifth Circuit in Rowinsky v. Bryan Inde21
pendent School District "concluded that Title IX was enacted
pursuant to Title VI, and found that Title IX requires proof of
intentional conduct on the part of the educational institution
24. !d. (quoting Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288,
1293 (N.D. Cal. 1993)).
25. See Davis, 74 F. 3d at 1193.
26. !d. at 1194 (quoting 20 U.S. C. § 1681(a)).
27. 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996), overruled by Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 638 (1999). The case involved two eighth grade girls, Janet and
Jane, at Sam Rayburn Middle School. Janet was allegedly physically and verbally
abused by G.S. on the school bus. He would swat her bottom and ask her questions
about her bra and panty size. He also called her a whore. Janet complained to the bus
driver several times, but to no avail. On another occasion, G.S. grabbed Jane's genital
area and her breasts. Jane, Janet, and their parents complained to the school Assistant
Principal. G.S. was suspended from riding the bus, and was later reassigned to sit behind the bus driver. This did not deter G.S. and he continued to harass the girls. At
another time, another male student L.H. harassed Janet by lifting up her skirt and
making crude remarks. Janet complained to the bus driver, but he did not acknowledge
her. Janet's mother complained to the assistant principal and gave him names of other
victims; he said he would investigate and take action. L.H. was suspended for three
days. A new bus driver was assigned and G.S. discontinued the harassment. Jane was
assigned to sit next to G.S. Both girls were removed from the bus by their mother. Mrs.
Rowinsky requested that G.S. be removed from the bus. Further action was refused by
school authorities until there was proof of the alleged assaults from juvenile records.
Yet another male student, F.F., unfastened Janet's bra by reaching under her shirt. He
was suspended for the rest of the day and the day after, but his conduct was not considered sexual. Mrs. Rowinsky and her lawyer later met with the superintendent to
complain about G.S.'s behavior. The superintendent said that the bus suspension had
been sufficient action. They were not informed about Title IX or Title IX complaint procedures. Mrs. Rowinsky then filed the instant action, alleging that the school district
and its officials condoned and caused hostile environment sexual harassment. !d. at
1006-1009.
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before monetary liability could be imposed. "28
In so finding, the court looked to the statutory language of
29
Title IX, as the Eleventh Circuit had done in Davis. The court
determined that the language of Title IX does not apply to the
conduct of third parties; rather, it only applies to discrimination by the funding recipient. The court justified its position
with the statute's structure, legislative history, and the Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") interpre30
tation of the statute.
OCR's interpretation "considers peer hostile environment
racial harassment a violation of title VI," but fails to comment
upon whether such an interpretation a~plies to third parties
1
and not solely to the recipient's actions. Analogizing Title IX
principles, the court concluded that in order for a plaintiff to
successfully bring a peer sexual harassment action, she "must
demonstrate that the school district responded to sexual har32
assment claims differently based on sex." Rowinsky thus
failed to show that the school had responded differently to her
daughters' assault claims than to those allegations made by
boys at the school.

C. The Conflict
Taking into consideration the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Davis and the Fifth Circuit's decision in Rowinsky, the circuits
were not only in conflict as to the standard of liability for a successful peer sexual harassment claim, but also as to the rationale and applicable principles underlying such claims. While one
circuit allowed third-party actions to constitute claims as long
as the school district knowingly failed to take action, the other
circuit only allowed such an action if the school's treatment of
peer harassment allegations was different based upon the complainer's sex. Additionally, the circuits' interpretations of Title
IX and the Congressional intent behind the statute varied. Because the approaches to peer sexual harassment were varied
and conflicting, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Davis
28. Megan Healy, Responding to Students' Pleas for Relief: The Need for a Consis·
tent Approach to Peer Sexual Harassment Claims, Comment, 17 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 4 79,
501 (1997).
29. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1011.
30. See id. at 1011-16.
31. ld. at 1016.
32. ld.
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in order to resolve the conflict.

II.

DAVIS V. MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION IN THE
SUPREME COURT

LaShonda Davis, a fifth grader at Hubbard Elementary in
Monroe County, Georgia, was allegedly sexuall¥ harassed re3
peatedly by one of her fellow classmates, G.F. The harassment allegedly began in December of 1992, when G.F. told
LaShonda, "I want to get in bed with you," and "I want to feel
your boobs," while attempting to touch her breasts and genital
34
area. Comparable actions allegedly occurred on or about
35
January 4 and 20, 1993. LaShonda reported these actions to
36
her mother and to her teacher, Diane Fort. Her mother in
turn also contacted Ms. Fort and was told that the principal,
37
Bill Querry, knew of the reported conduct.
Allegedly, G.F. continued to harass LaShonda for months.
In early February, during their physical education class, G.F.
reportedly placed a door stop in his pants and acted in a sexu38
ally suggestive manner toward LaShonda. She allegedly reported the incident to her physical education teacher, Whit
39
Maples. About a week later, G.F. harassed LaShonda again.
LaShonda reported the occurrence to another supervising
teacher, Joyce Pippen, and the petitioner again contacted the
40
teacher to follow up.
Petitioner alleged that another incident of sexual harassment occurred in early March in physical education class, and
that the incident was again reported by LaShonda to both Ma41
ples and Pippen. In April 1993, G.F. purportedly rubbed his
body in a sexually suggestive manner against LaShonda in the
42
school hallway, which she again reported to Fort. The harassment ended in May, when G.F. was charged with, and

33. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. ofEduc., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1666 (1999).
34. Id. at 1667.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1667.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
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pleaded guilty to, sexual battery.
Petitioner alleged that during these months of harassment,
44
LaShonda suffered greatly. Specifically, her grades dropped
45
due to an inability to concentrate on her school work. In addition, her father reported having found a suicide note in April
46
1993. Moreover, petitioner further alleged that LaShonda told
her that she "didn't know how much longer she could keep G.F.
47
Petitioner alleged that the school failed in these
off her."
months of harassment to take any disciplinary action in re48
sponse to G.F.'s behavior. Additionally, petitioner alleged that
she not only spoke with the teachers, but that in May she also
spoke with Principal Querry, asking him what action would be
taken against G.F. In response, Querry said, "I guess I'll have
to threaten him a little bit harder," and asked her why
49
LaShonda "was the only one complaining."
The com~laint alleged that other girls fell victim to G.F.'s
0
harassment. Allegedly a group of girls, including LaShonda,
attempted to speak with Querry about G.F.'s conduct. However, the girls were denied their request by a teacher who said,
51
"If Querry wants you, he'll call you."
Although LaShonda had reported G.F.'s harassment for
52
months, the school made no effort to separate them. According to the complaint, it was only after more than three months,
that LaShonda was even allowed to chanre her seat so that she
5
would no longer have to sit next to G.F. Furthermore, the petitioner alleged that the Monroe County Board of Education
("Board") had not instructed its personnel on responding to
peer sexual harassment, nor had it issued a policy on the matter. 54
Petitioner filed suit on May 4, 1994 in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, against the
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See id.
See id.
See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1667.
I d.
I d.
See id.
I d.
See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1667.
I d.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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Board, the school superintendent, and Principal Querry, seeking compensatory and punitive damages, attorney's fees, and
injunctive relief. The complaint alleged that under Title IX, the
Board was a recipient of federal funds and that:
'the persistent sexual advances and harassment by the student G.F. upon [LaShonda] interfered with her ability to attend school and perform her studies and activities,' and that
'[t]he deliberate indifference by Defendants to the unwelcome
sexual advances of a student upon LaShonda created an intimidating, hostile, offensive and abus[ive] school environ55
ment in violation of Title IX.'
The defendants filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure
6
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 5 The district court granted the motion, stating that under Title IX only
federally funded institutions could be sued and that the indi57
vidual defendants could not. As to the Board, the court stated
that Title IX only provided a basis for liability if the Board or
58
an employee of the Board had any role in the harassment. Petitioner appealed the district court's decision and an Eleventh
59
Circuit panel reversed.
The panel analogized Title VII law and a majority concluded that under Title IX failure to stop peer sexual harassment was an actionable claim against the Board. The Board's
motion for rehearing en bane was granted by the Eleventh Cir61
cuit.60 The District Court's decision was affirmed. The en bane
court concluded that "Title IX ... provides recipients with notice that they must stop their employees from engaging in discriminatory conduct, but the statute fails to provide a recipient
with sufficient notice of a duty to prevent student-on-student
62
harassment."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve
63
the circuit conflict. In reversing the Eleventh Circuit, the
Court held that a private action for damages exists under Title

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

/d. at 1668.
See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1668.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1668 (discussing Davis, 120 F.3d at 1401).
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. OfEduc., 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1998).
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IX against a school board for peer sexual harassment if the
funding recipient is deliberately indifferent to the harassment,
the recipient has actual knowledge of the sexual harassment,
and the harassment is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it deprives the victims access to the educational
64
opportunities or benefits the school provides.

III. THE SUPREME COURT'S REASONING
The Court recognized the conflict within the circuits and set
out to resolve "whether, and under what circumstances, a recipient of federal educational funds can be liable in a private
damages action arising from student-on-student sexual har65
assment ... " The Court had previously recognized a private
66
right of action for money damages under Title IX. However,
such money damages are only available if the Title IX federal
funding recipient has adequate notice of liability for the action.67 Such notice must be clear and unambiguous in the language of the statute, as Congress is acting through its spending
68
power. In so generating legislation, Congress has effectively
invoked a contract with the states and "in return for federal
funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions."69 Under such power, Congress can therefore only hold
funding recipients liable for their own actions and not the ac70
tions of third parties.
Respondents argued that the petitioner sought to hold the
Board liable for the actions of a third party, G.F.'s, and not
71
their own. The Court disagreed, stating that "petitioner attempted to hold the Board liable for its own decision to remain
idle in the face of known student-on-student harassment in its
72
schools" and not for G.F.'s harassing conduct. The bar on liability concerns the Gebser adequate notice requirement. In
64. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1669-76.
65. ld. at 1668.
66. See id. at 1669 (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S.
60, 112S.C~ 1028(1992».
67. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1670.
68. See id.
69. ld. (quoting Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,
17 (1981».
70. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1670.
71. See id.
72. ld.
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Gebser, the court found that the school had notice because it
clearly violated the terms of the statute by deliberately remain73
ing indifferent in the face of discrimination. This deliberate
indifference standard rejected any notions of agency principles
(imputing the actions of others on the Board) or negligence. Instead, it imposed upon the school district liability for its own
74
official decision to remain indifferent to the harassment. Additionally, the court stated that public schools have long been
on notice that they can be held liable for their failure to re75
spond to the discriminating actions of third parties.
The common law as well as state courts have put schools on
notice for "failure to protect students from the tortious acts of
76
third parties," including their peers. However, not any third
party will trigger liability. The deliberate indifference standard
only applies when the school has some degree of control over
77
the harassing party. The funding recipient must have been
able to take action against the third farty; otherwise, its indif7
ference would not allow for liability.
This deliberate indifference must subject the students to
harassment, or at a minimum, '"cause' students 'to undergo'
79
harassment or 'make them liable or vulnerable' to it." In order
for the school to be liable, the harassment must occur in an
area or at an event which is under the funding recipient's con80
trol. The analysis is as follows:
These factors combine to limit a recipient's damages liability
to circumstances wherein the recipient exercises substantial
control over both the harasser and the context in which the
known harassment occurs. Only then can the recipient be said
to 'expose' its students to harassment or 'cause' them to un81
dergo it 'under' the recipient's programs.

As applied to the case at bar, the sexual harassment took
place on school grounds, mainly in the classroom, and under
the supervision of school teachers. In this case, the funding re-

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See id.
Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1671.
!d.
!d. at 1671-72.
See id. at 1672.
See id.
Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1671.
See id.
!d.
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cipient maintained a substantial amount of control over the harasser.82 The Court recognized that public school officials maintain a substantial amount of control over studentsg' much more
3
than an employer would over adult employees. They concluded that "recipients of federal funding may be liable for 'subjecting' their students to discrimination where the recipient is
deliberately indifferent to known acts of student-on-student
sexual harassment and the harasser is under the school's disci84
.
p1mary
au th on'ty. "
Furthermore, the Court placed limits on the liability, stating that it would not engage in second guessing the discipline
85
decisions made by school officials. Funding recipients must
respond to incidents of peer sexual harassment in a way that is
86
"not clearly unreasonable." Administrators will still have the
flexibility to respond to discipline situations in a manner in
87
which they deem fit. It is only when their "response to the
harassment or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of
88
the known circumstances," that they may encounter liability.
Moreover, the standard is flexible and directly corresponds to
the amount of control the school can exercise over its students.89 Thus, a university would not be expected to exercise
the same degree of control as an elementary school, "and it
would be entirely reasonable for a school to refrain from a form
of disciplinary action that would expose it to constitutional or
90
statutory claims."
Students deserve to benefit from their education and should
not be denied access to those benefits based upon their gender.
Such denial to access does not have to be a physical barrier to
entrance, but the sexual harassment must be "so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, and that [it] so undermines and
detracts from the victims' educational experience, that the victim-students are effectively denied equal access to an institu-

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See id. at 1673.
See id.
!d.
See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1674.
!d.
See id.
!d.
See id.
See id.

287] PUBLIC SCHOOL PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT

299

91

tion's resources and opportunities." It is possible that a single
instance can rise to the level of severity required. However, the
Court felt it unlikely that such an instance would meet the
standard due to the "inevitability of student misconduct and
the amount of litigation that would be invited by entertaining
claims of official indifference to a single instance of one-on-one
92
peer harassment." The Court thus limited peer sexual harassment money damages actions to those cases "havin& a sys9
temic effect on educational programs or activities .... "
Whether a particular situation of harassment elevates to
the level of actionable harassment depends upon the ages of
the harasser and the victim, the number of people involved, the
relationships involved the circumstances, and the expectations
94
involved in the event. The Court recognized that children do
act in manners that are inappropriate for adults and stated
that:
[d]amages are not available for simple acts of teasing and
name-calling among school children, however, even where
these comments target differences in gender. Rather, in the
context of student-on-student harassment, damages are
available only where the behavior is so severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive that it denies its victims the equal access
95
to education that Title IX is designed to protect.

Additionally, a mere drop in grades is insufficient to prove
96
that harassment is actionable. As is the case here, a grade decline provides evidence of a possible connection between the
harasser's conduct and the denial of educational benefits, but
the plaintiffs claim also relies heavily upon the severity of the
harassment and the school's knowledge and deliberate indiffer97
ence to the harassment.
IV. WHY SHOULD SCHOOLS BE HELD RESPONSIBLE?

The Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights
("OCR") states that it has long recognized peer sexual harass91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Davis, 119 at 1675.
ld. at 1676.
ld.
See id. at 1675.
Id.
Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1676.
See id.
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OCR is committed to:

[t]he elimination of sexual harassment of students in federally assisted educational programs [because it] is a high priority for OCR. Through its enforcement of Title IX, OCR has
learned that a significant number of students, both male and
female, have experienced sexual harassment, that sexual
harassment can interfere with a student's academic performance and emotional and physical well-being, and that preventing and remedying sexual harassment in schools is essential to ensure nondiscriminatory, safe environments in which
99
students can learn.

Schools were created to educate students on the basics:
reading, writing, and arithmetic. Society's view of the education system's responsibilities have changed significantly. Now
schools are not only responsible for teaching the "three R's,"
but they are also to teach students to become productive members of society. This productive member responsibility is quite
broad, and among many things includes teaching students social skills. Social skills involve same sex interactions as well as
opposite gender relations. From a very young age, children
learn how to relate with one another. Although social skills are
taught in the home, many social skills are taught in the
schools, for this is where children come into contact with various personalities and get involved in various social situations
and altercations. Thus, it has become and will continue to
evolve into another responsibility for our public education system.
In order to provide such education, our schools need to be
safe. Students need to feel comfortable and welcome at school
so that they can enhance their learning potential in a positive
100
learning environment. Thus, in the case of peer sexual harassment, a school's mission is two-fold: to educate their students about sexual harassment to help them develop social
skills, and to prevent, deter, and punish sexual harassment actions in order to create and maintain a safe and effective learn-

98. See Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights, Sexual Harassment
Guidance: Harassment of Students by Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties,
(visited Sept. 30, 1999) <www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/sexharOO.html>.
99. Id.
100. See Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, et. a!., Sexual Harassment in Schools: An
Analysis of the "Knew or Should Have Known" Liability Standard in Title IX Peer Sexual Harassment Cases, 12 Wrs. WOMEN'S L.J. 301, 319-320 (1997).
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ing environment.
Sexual harassment is a serious and pervasive problem in society. In elementary, middle and high school, students observe, experience and participate in sexual harassment of
their peers. Eventually, these students enter the workforce,
where thf~ observe, experience and participate in sexual harassment.

Children learn by example. If students see other students
engaging in sexually harassing behavior, and also see that such
behavior is ignored by authority figures, then students learn
that such behavior is acceptable. "Furthermore, 'ignoring certain behavior sends a message of inequality to girls . . . and
sets the stage for how men and women treat each other as
adults.' Thus, men and boys will not realize the inappropriateness of their behavior and will continue to behave in a similar
102
manner.''
If sexual harassment is permitted in schools, female students are not only seen as unequal to their male peers, but
their self-esteem is endangered as well.
Every harassing act engenders in girls the feeling that they
are inferior persons. Sexual harassment impedes the emotional and educational development of young girls who admit
feeling embarrassed, afraid, angry, frustrated, and powerless
in school. The ramifications extend beyond the psychological,
as girls report suffering physical symptoms like insomnia,
listlessness, and depression. In the end, the manifestation of
concrete consequences, such as absenteeism, tardiness, decreased classroom participation, and poor scholastic performance illustrate the severe impact harassin~ behavior has on a
3
girl's ability to receive an equal education.

Therefore, female students are unable to receive an education equivalent to that of their male peers because sexual harassment significantly disrupts the learning process. Schools are
in the business of educating, and if some students are notreceiving that education due to a barrier created at school by
other students, then the school officials should have a duty to
101. ld. at 301.
102. Id. at 303-04 (quoting Monica Sherer, No Longer Just Child's Play: School
Liability Under Title IX For Sexual Harassment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2135 (1993).
103. Laura M. Sullivan, Note, An Evolutionary Perspective of Peer Sexual Harassment in American Schools: Premising Liability on Sexual, Rather than Power Dynamics, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 329, 341-42 (1997).

302

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2000

eliminate that barrier.
V. WHAT ARE SCHOOLS TO Do Now?

In Davis, the Supreme Court recognized a school's responsibility to educate and protect students. The Court imposed liability upon school districts for peer sexual harassment if the
school was "deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment, of
which they have actual knowledge, that is so severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits pro104
vided by the school." In order to meet this standard, schools
must respond to sexual harassment claims made by their students. The Court emphasized that the responsibility for student discipline rests solely with school officials and that the
Court did not wish to engage in second guessing such decisions.105 "[T]he recipient must merely respond to known ~eer
16
harassment in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable."
Thus, the Court requires that school officials respond to
known harassment in a "not clearly unreasonable" manner.
This high burden that a plaintiff must prove (that the school
has been deliberately indifferent to the harassment) is beneficial to school districts and boards. The burden protects them
from monetary responsibility for every incident or even most
incidents of peer sexual harassment. However, the requirement
does nothing to address how schools can and should try to
eliminate sexual harassment in the first place so that they can
not only avoid liability, but more importantly, so that all students receive an equal education.
Schools should establish a sexual harassment policy as well
as an education program. It is important to institute a prevention program and to establish and effectuate a discipline policy
for occurrences of sexual harassment.
A. What is Sexual Harassment?

Before schools can implement programs, punish harassers,
and eventually stop sexual harassment, school officials must
understand what sexual harassment is so that they can further
104. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1675.
105. See id. at 1674.
106. Id.
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educate their employees and students. There is no exact or
clear definition of sexual harassment, but we do need some sort
107
of working definition.
In the case of peer sexual harassment,
harassment occurs when unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal, nonverbal, or
physical conduct of a nature by another student ... are sufficiently severe, persistent, or pervasive to limit a student's
ability to participate in or benefit from an educational program or activity or to create a hostile or abusive educational
environment. Sexual harassment includes conduct that is also
criminal in nature such as rape, sexual assault, stalking, and
108
similar offenses.

Examples of sexual harassment include, but are not limited
to, uninvited or unwelcome sexual touching, sexual verbal
abuse, unwelcome invitations or demands for sexual behaviors,
and unwelcome sexual words or symbols directed at a student.109

B. Implementing a Sexual Harassment Policy and Discipline
Procedure
Once school officials can define sexual harassment, they
will be well on their way to identifying it and eventually eliminating it from their schools. Officials should institute a schoolwide sexual harassment policy. This policy should be written
and should be disseminated to all students, faculty, and em110
ployees, and should be prominently posted at the school site.
School officials should consider adding such a written policy
statement to their code of conducts, which are regularly disseminated to the student body, and to personnel handbooks.m
The policy should contain the following elements:
• The school's commitment to protect students from
harassment;

107. See Monica Sherer, No Longer Just Child's Play: School Liability Under Title
IX For Sexual Harassment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2125 (1993).
108. Department of Education Office of Civil Rights, Protecting Students from
Harassment and Hate Crime: A Guide for Schools, (last modified Jan. 1999)
<www.ed.gov./pubs/Harassment/policy1.html >.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
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• A definition of sexual harassment and examples of
such;
• Require reporting of incidents by both the staff and
students;
• Explain the importance of reporting harassment and
the steps to do so;
• Describe the steps the school will take to prevent as
well as discipline those engaging in the harassment;
• Prohibit retaliation against those reporting incidents;
• Make sure that all have knowledge of their individual
rights and duties. 112
In addition to a written policy, schools should also develop a
discipline and investigation procedure for incidents of harassment. School officials should "identify and respond to all inci113
dents of harassment .... " One person in the school should be
designated as the one to receive and investigate the complaints.114 This person could be but does not have to be the
school's compliance officer. The person should be a school official who understands the urgency and importance of prohibiting sexual harassment. This person should be trained in the
115
procedures and in receiving complaints. Students and employees alike should be aware of who the designated official is.
The reporting procedure should be simple and easy enough as
to not deter reporting incidents. This school harassment official
should also be someone who has the authority to "take correc116
tive action." Additionally:
[s]chool personnel should not overlook incidents that, viewed
alone, may not rise to the level of unlawful harassment. Consistent enforcement ... and meaningful interventions by staff
to teach appropriate behavior will tend to discourage more severe misconduct and to help achieve an atmosphere of respect

112. See id.
113. Id.
114. See Department of Education Office of Civil Rights, Protecting Students from
Harassment and Hate Crime: A Guide for Schools, (last modified Jan. 1999)
<www.ed.gov./pubs/Harassment/policyl.html >.
115. See id.
116. Id.
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117

C. Education as Prevention: Educating the Entire School
Once a policy and disciplinary procedures have been developed, they need to be implemented. The most effective way for
this to happen is to educate the entire school community.
School officials should begin by educating themselves and their
118
staff through staff in-service training sessions.
Students
should also be educated through curriculum, activity and mediation programs, and presentations by outside officials and
119
law enforcement agents. The important thing is to educate
the entire school community in order to "overcome ignorance,
. t rus t , an db'1ases. "120
m1s
VI. CONCLUSION

Davis makes clear that peer sexual harassment is identifiably sexual discrimination under Title IX and actionable for
monetary damages if school officials are knowingly indifferent
to the harassment. The Court says that schools must not
clearly unreasonably respond to students' allegations. However, if schools only discipline, the problem of peer sexual harassment will never go away. Schools must do more than just
respond to allegations- they must attack the source of the
problem. They must educate the entire school community concerning sexual harassment in order to eliminate the myths, assumptions, biases, stereotypes, and misconduct. Through
proper education, schools can effectively curb incidents of sexual harassment among students. This will allow them to effectuate their goal of providing an equal education to all of their
students and help them truly produce socially responsible and
productive members of society.
Lillian Chaves

117. Id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. Department of Education Office of Civil Rights, Protecting Students from
Harassment and Hate Crime: A Guide for Schools, (last modified Jan. 1999)
<www.ed.gov./pubs/Harassment/policyl.html >.

